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November 18 marks what could be the final chapter in the decades-long Maoist insurgency in India. Deep inside Papikonda Nationwide Park in Andhra Pradesh’s Alluri Sitharama Raju district, security forces killed Madvi Hidma, the elusive commander of the Central Army Fee (CMC) and the Maoists’ final hope for army revival. His dying, coming six months after the killing of Common Secretary Nambala Kesava Rao alias Basavaraju in Might, indicators not only a tactical defeat however the efficient collapse of the armed battle that after threatened to engulf huge swathes of India’s forested heartland.
Hidma’s killing is important not only for who he was — a tribal chief in a Telugu-speaking dominant social gathering management and who rose meteorically to the highest echelons of the CPI(Maoist) — however for the place it occurred. He didn’t fall in his acquainted terrain of Bastar’s dense jungles, which he knew “just like the again of his hand”, however in unfamiliar Andhra territory, a testomony to how far the motion had been pushed from its strongholds. Gunned down alongside his spouse Madakam Raje and 4 trusted bodyguards, his dying was instantly adopted by the elimination of seven different cadres, together with Metturi Joga Rao alias Tech Shankar, and the arrest of fifty Maoists throughout Andhra Pradesh inside 24 hours.
The final warrior
Born in 1981 in Purvati village in Chhattisgarh’s Sukma district, the Gondi-speaking Hidma joined the motion at 16 and swiftly grew to become what surrendered Maoists describe as a “gifted fighter” — fierce, motivational, and a very good strategist. Regardless of missing formal training, he was tech-savvy, at all times carrying a laptop computer or pill, and possessed legendary communication abilities that helped him extract the perfect from his cadres. Basavaraju, himself an skilled in guerrilla warfare reportedly educated by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam within the Eighties, noticed Hidma’s expertise early and elevated him to command the Dandakaranya Particular Zonal Committee. He grew to become the one tribal chief from Bastar to succeed in the Maoist Central Committee.
After Basavaraju’s dying in an encounter, Hidma assumed management of the CMC and its premier preventing unit, Battalion 1 of the Individuals’s Liberation Guerrilla Military (PLGA). His report was devastating: not less than 26 main assaults, together with the 2010 Tadmetla assault that killed 76 CRPF personnel, the 2013 Jhiram Ghati ambush that killed Congress leaders Mahendra Karma and Nand Kumar Patel, the 2017 Burkapal assault that claimed the lives of 25 CRPF personnel, and the Tekulguda ambush that left 21 safety personnel lifeless.
But, for all his prowess, Hidma commanded a shrinking pressure. The CPI(Maoist), which boasted 45 Central Committee members in 2010, now has barely 10-12 left. Since 2024, roughly 2,120 Maoists have surrendered and over 560 killed, together with prime leaders. The statistics inform a narrative of inexorable decline.
Ultimate defeat
To grasp this denouement, one should return to the motion’s origins in Chhattisgarh’s Dandakaranya forests. The Maoist presence there started not as an offensive however as a strategic retreat. Following the collapse of the Naxalbari motion within the Seventies, leaders concluded that they had erred by not getting ready a “rear space” for regrouping. In 1980, seven squads totalling 49 cadres had been dispatched to the roughly 100,000 sq. km “Dandakaranya area”, spanning 4 States. Their mission was to ascertain it as a protected rear sector for the Telangana guerrilla zone.
The cadres gained tribal belief by addressing grievances — forcing contractors to boost tendu leaf costs, tackling forest division abuses, and confronting sexual harassment by officers. A high-ranking tribal Maoist chief as soon as defined the core situation: tribals felt they weren’t “handled as people”, missing respect for his or her language, faith, and lifestyle. Regardless of infrastructure like faculty buildings and electrical poles, lecturers and electrical energy remained absent.
Satirically, state-sponsored counter-insurgency campaigns proved the motion’s finest recruiters. The Eighties Jan Jagran Abhiyan, which arrested and killed suspected Naxal sympathisers, pushed tribal leaders to advise youth to affix the Maoists for security. The 2005 Salwa Judum marketing campaign, declared unlawful by the Supreme Court docket, pressured villagers to decide on sides — and plenty of selected the Maoists, inflicting the social gathering to develop manifold.
As ranks swelled with tribal recruits, army operations escalated. The primary PLGA firm shaped in 2001, adopted by the formidable Battalion-1 (later led by Hidma) in 2009. The interval noticed devastating assaults: the 2007 Ranibodli assault killing 55 personnel and the 2010 Mukram ambush claiming 75 CRPF lives.
But, the motion at all times carried the seeds of its personal destruction. As academician Nirmalagshu Mukherji famous in 2010, fairly than organising tribals into cooperatives or constructing well being and training establishments, the Maoists maintained the exploitative contractor system to tax and garner revenues. Their intention wasn’t socio-economic growth however recruitment for armed battle.This emphasis on armed battle flowed from a flawed understanding of the Indian state and a dedication to copy China’s Nineteen Twenties revolutionary path. Former Common Secretary Ganapathi warned in opposition to “getting slowed down in legalism and economism“ and forgetting that “plenty must be ready for seizure of energy’. This iron grip in Abujhmarh created discontent amongst tribals, which intensified as they gained better connection to the surface world within the 2010s and 2020s.
The state’s complete counter-strategy mixed safety operations with developmental outreach. The Union House Ministry established a devoted Left Wing Extremism Division in 2006, offering monetary assist for fortifying police stations and strengthening state forces. The CPI(Maoist) was banned beneath the Illegal Actions (Prevention) Act in 2009. Crucially, welfare measures — Public Distribution System outlets, Anganwadi centres — had been routed by way of new ahead safety camps close to Maoist areas. By the mid-2010s, the identical tribal leaders who had inspired becoming a member of the Maoists started displaying wariness about their presence. The interval of 2024-25 proved decisive. Over 50 new ahead camps in South Bastar and Narayanpur restricted the motion of the PLGA, whereas almost 2,000 native ‘Bastar Fighters’ with superior terrain and language data addressed the Maoist risk considerably. ‘Operation Kagar’, launched in April 2025, systematically focused the management — claiming Basavaraju in Might and Hidma in November.
In August 2024, the Maoist Politburo acknowledged nationwide setbacks and failure to attain 2020 targets, reframing its technique towards tactical retreat and defending the social gathering. It restructured battalions into smaller items to keep away from encirclement. But even this couldn’t save Basavaraju or Hidma.
The street forward
Simply earlier than Hidma’s dying, surrendered Central Committee Member Mallojula Venugopal alias Sonu (youthful brother of erstwhile Maoist senior chief Mallojula Koteswara Rao alias Kishenji) appealed to remaining Maoists to put down arms, stating bluntly that armed battle was “now not related” and their pressure “no match for current well-trained and well-equipped safety forces”.
The social gathering’s Central Committee responded by expelling Venugopal as a “traitor” and pledging in an October 2025 assertion that it will “by no means give up to the enemy”. But, such defiance can not obscure the motion’s collapse — the assertion itself admitted the enemy had “gained a bonus” and acknowledged the necessity to rebuild “whereas defending the Get together”. The rebel social gathering is now led by Thippiri Tirupathi alias Devuji, although its Central Committee is but to satisfy, fearing safety forces’ reprisals, to endorse this determination.
Because the weapons more and more fall silent, the problem shifts. A spotlight solely on safety might create new grievances. Solely a welfare-minded method permitting tribal integration with dignity can stop resurgence. For the Maoists, with management depleted by way of age, imprisonment, or dying in encounters, the motion faces its severest disaster. The story of their vicissitudes ought to counsel a severe rethink on their understanding of the Indian state and the futility of an armed battle that relegated mass mobilisation and socio-economic organisation. The dream of revolution, it seems, has lastly died within the forests of south-central India.
Printed – November 23, 2025 02:17 am IST
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